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by Stefan Collignon*
Abstract. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty has revealed a profound crisis of
legitimacy in EU policy making. After 50 years of successful integration, the enlarged new
Europe needs new and more democratic forms of governance. Producing good policy results
is no longer sufficient to legitimise the European integration project because of growing
collective action problems. Value-identity also fails as a source for legitimacy, because values
separate as much as they unify. In this context, the procedural rules of modern democracies
are the answer to Europe’s crisis. A new Constitution for a Political Union is needed.
The European Union is in a profound crisis. The way it responds to it will determine
whether the European dream can survive. The crisis has been revealed by the failed
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and aggravated by the European Council meeting in
June 2005, where the heads of state and government failed to agree on a financial framework
for the EU-budget over the next 7 years. Without the financial means to implement policies,
the efficiency of European policy making is seriously jeopardized, and without a constitution
there is little hope that this will improve.
Yet, the idea of European integration is not dead. When the citizens of France and the
Netherlands rejected Europe’s Constitutional Treaty in the referendum, they only brought into
the open the crisis of EU legitimacy that has developed for years in the shadow of the high
diplomacy of European intergovernmental cooperation. However, they did not create this
crisis; nor did they reject “Europe”. Opinion polls in France reveal that only one quarter of the
NO-voters were sensitive to “sovereignist” arguments about maintaining French identity (see
for example Ipsos, 2005). Given that the No won with 54 percent, the ‘sovereignist’ share
reflects approximately the electoral weight of J.M. LePen, the extreme right wing candidate in
the 2002 presidential elections. Three quarters of those who voted against the Constitution did
so, not because they rejected Europe, but because the wanted a different Europe.
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2But what Europe do they want? The problem is that European integration has created such
a wide range of common public goods, which are initiated and administered by governments,
that citizens have a vague feeling political control escapes them. They want more democracy.
Unless the issue of democracy is handled, the sustainability of the European Union is in
question, with far-reaching geo-strategic consequences. I will first trace the main challenges
to the European integration model and then discuss possible responses.
The European integration model and its challenges.
What “Europe” is all about.
After World War II, 50 million dead people and years of entrenched hatred between
nations reconstruction meant more than rebuilding the economy: trust and mutual respect had
to replace aggressive nationalism and open hostility. The project of European integration was
the vehicle for building bridges across borders and links between individuals in different
countries. Jean Monnet had summarised this intention in the phrase “we are uniting people,
not forming a coalition of states”. President John F. Kennedy understood the importance of
this project, when he acknowledged Monnet with the words: “Under your inspiration, Europe
has moved closer to unity in less than twenty years than it had done before in a thousand.
(…)You are transforming Europe by the power of a constructive idea” (Duchene, 1994).
No doubt, the early progress in European integration was supported by pax americana,
the stability of the Bretton Woods system and the ideological front by the Western world
against the Soviet Union, but Monnet’s method consisted of creating practical structures for
economic and political interaction. They contributed to the emergence of a culture of
transnational cooperation, which replaced the traditional nationalistic competition between
nation states; national governments’ actions were constrained by European law, and
individualistic liberal values replaced the subordination and confinement of individual interest
to ethnic and national communities.
The progress was slow, gradual, and not without crises, but it has transformed Europe. The
EU has become an increasingly important factor in citizens’ daily lives. The domain for
European policy making has grown. The single European market has opened a vast space for
firms to reap economies of scale, increase productivity and it has freed the creativity of
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costs. Economic integration also pushed political cooperation forward. Removing trade
barriers required de-regulation in member-states, but also re-regulation at the European level.
Otherwise, fair and efficient competition could be undermined by national legislation or other
actions from local authorities. One market necessitated creating a single currency, for
otherwise the efficiency of competitive firms would have been regularly distorted by volatility
in foreign exchange markets. Thus, monetary policy had to be delegated to the European
Central Bank (ECB). But this also requires designing macro-economic stabilisation policies at
the level of the Eurozone: from an economic point of view, nation states have become
provinces of Euroland. Building Europe on the four freedoms of movement for goods,
services, capital and labour soon also necessitated increased cooperation in justice and home
affairs. Making the labour market more flexible by removing obstacles to labour mobility
within the EU did not only require the mutual recognition of diplomas and skills formation,
but it also called for harmonised immigration policies at Europe’s outside borders. This has
been put in practice by the Schengen agreement, and the cooperation of the juridical and law
enforcement systems.
The process of adding new task to the European Union’s responsibilities for managing
and governing these common goods and concerns of European citizens is frequently called the
“deepening” of the integration process. It has gone in parallel with a “widening” of the Union
by adding new members from the initial 6 to now 25 member states. Both processes have had
a considerable impact on the European Union’s governance and are at the root of today’s
crisis of legitimacy.
European scholars have debated at length whether the dynamics of European
integration is better explained by neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. The first theory
claims it to be the quasi-automatic consequence of transferring one function of governance to
the EU, thereby creating disequilibria in nation states that require subsequently even more
delegation. Intergovernmentalists argue that governments cooperate for selfish reasons as long
as integration increases their power. Both theories do not necessarily exclude each other. But
they do miss an important point: however well (or insufficiently) government elites cooperate,
European unification can only progress, or even simply be sustained, if it is supported by
European citizens. Neofunctionalists expect support will come from managing common goods
efficiently, intergovernmentalists believe that it is linked to the value communities that
4governments represent. Yet, in recent years, support has eroded. While in the early 1990s,
more than two thirds of Europeans thought membership in the EU was “a good thing”, in
recent years this approval has fallen, and is now fluctuating in the range between 48-52
percent (Eurobarometer, 62). So, what has gone wrong?
Challenge I: the efficiency of policy making.
In the early years, neofunctionalists were right. Citizens did support European
integration, as Europe contributed to efficient policy results. This has been called output-
legitimacy. European policy makers often proceed by designing bold projects, which then
mobilise national polities and elites and in the end get accepted by ordinary people. The best-
known example was the creation of the single European market, which was implemented as a
program (called “Europe 1992”) of 233 directives of European law and accompanied by
strong input from Europe’s civil societies. Similarly, the technical introduction of the euro
was prepared in close cooperation between the European Commission, the European Central
Bank and the private sector. However, the transposition of European directives into national
laws is often slow and national measures may contravene EU law. In 1999, 13 percent of the
single market directives issued before 1992 were still not transposed (Wallace and Wallace,
2000). In response to this evident failure, successive European Council meetings have set up
monitoring processes. The Cardiff Council in 1998 aimed to complete the single market, the
Luxemburg Process in 1997 intended to improve labour market reforms. When European
monetary union started in 1999, the Cologne Process established also the macroeconomic
policy dialogue between wage bargainers, governments and the European Central Bank. Yet,
all these processes have yielded disappointing results. Already the term “process” indicated
that governments could not agree on substantive policies, although they hoped that a process
of consultation could improve results. The coordination failure was recognised by the
Portuguese EU-presidency in 2000. The “Lisbon strategy” formulated the goal to “create the
most competitive economy in the world within 10 years” by “loading the empty wagons of the
processes”.1 This ambition, originally proposed by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, has become
the ridicule of European policy making. The EU is far from this objective. It created the “open
method of coordination”, which was another euphemism for not being able to set up more
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5constraining mechanisms for decision-making. A study-group chaired by the former Dutch
Prime Minister Wim Kok found that “half way to 2010 the overall picture is very mixed and
much needs to be done in order to prevent Lisbon from becoming a synonym for missed
objectives and failed promises” (Kok, 2004)
The failing policy coordination and the decreasing efficiency of policy making in a
deepening and widening Europe have real consequences for peoples’ lives. Unemployment
has remained persistently at high levels. Economic growth has been lagging behind the US for
more than one decade. Social welfare policies are under threat because they were designed for
fewer people and growing economies and the adaptation to an aging population is painful.
The pressure is increasing on public finances; public investment, traditionally the basis for an
industry-friendly and growth-supporting policy framework in Europe, has fallen to minimal
levels. The budget of the European Union amounts to only 1 percent of GDP, and still
governments cannot agree on it. All these developments have left European citizens with a
vague feeling that the EU is no longer the guarantee for prosperity it once seemed to be.
Policy makers still insist that Europe contributes to better living standards, but at the same
time they blame “Brussels” for all the unpopular decisions for which they do not want to
assume responsibility before their voters.
Europe’s stagnation is often explained by the absence of strong leaders committed to
the European cause. Indeed the generation of leaders who still had known the war is largely
gone. However, this explanation does not grasp the systemic causes of Europe’s coordination
failure. These causes are better described by what political economists call the “collective
action problem” (Olson, 1977). This means that incentives for individual actors, such as
European governments, are contrary to the collective interest, which would improve the
welfare of all. Collective action problems therefore lead to suboptimal outcomes. With
intergovernmental policy making, they have gained in importance, because national
governments are responsible for their narrow national constituency, while nobody is
responsible for the collective interest of all European citizens. Although the policy domain is
large, where benefits can be obtained for citizens through coordinating policies at the
European level, when it comes to implementing them there are costs accruing to governments,
who may therefore be tempted to free-ride or block other member states. This is true not only
with respect to the Stability and Growth Pact, the European budget, tax harmonisation, but
also to immigration policies and most of the measures to b e taken under the Lisbon Strategy.
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of members in a group. Because each state has such an incentive, none will contribute to the
desired result. Hence, with a growing number of member states and a deeper domain of
policies, intergovernmental governance is becoming increasingly impotent and output
legitimacy is in decline. The problem is that voluntary cooperation between governments is
no longer effective in a EU with 25 members. At 6 or 12, personal interactions between key
policy makers could overcome gridlock. At 25 members states, European Council meetings
have become huge bureaucratic events, involving hundreds of civil servants. The answer to
the collective action problem is more delegation to EU authorities, capable of providing
efficient decision-making at the European level. But delegating more power to the EU level
may not only be resisted by national politicians and bureaucrats, it also poses serious
problems for the legitimacy of policy making in the EU.
Challenge II: the democratic deficit
The basic principle of democracy is that citizens who are affected by policy decisions
have the ultimate word to say about what policies are to be pursued. Governments are the
agents of citizens, charged to implement policies in accordance with their preferences. If
preferences change, or governments do not implement them correctly, citizens can revoke
them. This mechanism provides input legitimacy for policy making. But the European Union
is not a democracy, even if member states have to be a democracy if they wish to join. For
years, critics have pointed at Europe’s democratic deficit. Yet, like the US current account
deficit, the EU’s democratic deficit is growing year by year and as in the US, there are plenty
of scholars who claim that it doesn’t matter (see for example Moravcsik, 2005). For them the
EU is an international organisation, certainly a very comprehensive one, which has been
charged by national governments (and not by citizens) to administer certain technical
functions (trade and competition policies, monetary policy, etc.), while citizens continue to
express their democratic preferences in the framework of nation states. This model was
certainly appropriate in the early years of European integration. But as more and more tasks
were bundled together at the European level in order to achieve the economic and political
benefits of scale, policy decisions by one member state had external effects in other member
states. This contributed to the gradual and increasingly more widespread erosion of the
democratic principle.
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citizens in neighbouring countries, without these citizens being able to influence them. Thus,
the principle of correspondence, whereby democratic government is “by the people for the
people”, is infringed by externalities. This is of course true for international relations in
general. Yet, while a small amount of externalities could always be handled by foreign
ministers, the deepening of European integration has broadened the range of policy
externalities to an extend that has started to affect the essence of democracy.
Intergovernmental policy cooperation was intended to internalise these externalities. For this
purpose, governments negotiate in European legislation, which subsequently needs to be
transposed into national law. National Parliaments then have to vote for this legislation, which
they can no longer amend, for otherwise the intergovernmental deals unravel. Thus, the
elected representatives of the people are hardly more than a rubber-stamp for government
bureaucracies. In many EU-countries, up to two thirds of legislation fall into this category.
Second, a side-effect of this mode of governance is the invariability of policy making.
Compromises between governments inhibit the adaptation to changing preferences of citizens.
Intergovernmentalism does not only prevent citizens to express their preferences at the EU-
level, it also perverts democracy within the nation state. For example, French voters have
consistently kicked out any incumbent government over the last quarter of a century, but
policies have hardly changed. No wonder, populist parties are gaining votes and influence.
Europe’s governance increasingly functions like a pre-democratic ancien régime, where the
bureaucracies and governments are the aristocracy and their academic advisors the clergy. It
is sometimes argued that the EU has no democratic deficit, because national governments are
democratically elected. However, this argument is flawed. The purpose of democratic
elections is to provide the framework for a public debate about fundamental policy options, to
allow citizens to make their choices and then elect a government. In the EU, the European
Commission comes closest to a European government, although it is not elected by citizens,
but nominated by the European Council. Yet, the Council is not subject to general elections
providing the opportunity for European-wide policy deliberation. Its democratic legitimacy
resembles more an eternal parliament that only recruits new members through by-elections.
Who would call such a system a democracy?
The most common objection to democratising policy making in the EU is the absence of
demos or a public sphere. It is claimed that respecting and tolerating political opponents is
only possible within nation-states where intense and exclusive bounds between individuals
8reflect the culture and identity of similar values and preferences. However, this analysis
mistakes the results of a historic process for its precondition. Value and preference consensus
is the result of common deliberation and democratic institutions are a necessary condition to
make it possible. It is not by coincidence that ethnic strife and violent conflict is more
frequent in dictatorial regimes because democratic institutions enable the process of
deliberation, which leads to consensus. Overcoming the fragmentation of Europe’s polity
would require institutions that allow European-wide policy deliberation. Yet, this is
apparently not possible, as long as there is no European public sphere that facilitates the same
intensity of communication flows across borders as within nation states. However, this
idealised image of public deliberation is rarely found in reality. Even in strong nation-states,
not mentioning federal states, regional or sectoral communication flows are significantly more
intense. What is specific to Europe is the lack of integrated dominant agendas, a set of issues
or topics that turn up simultaneously in various mass media and general political discourse
(Eriksson et al. 2004). But this is precisely the consequence of the democratic deficit, not its
cause. For who would be interested in debating policy issues, if European policies were not
subject to the popular vote? Who would bother to collect information, if policies are
determined by experts? Who would vote for a parliament that does not elect a government?
The answer to the legitimacy problem is that Europe needs a political constitution
whereby the citizens living in the European Union transfer policy making competences to
European institutions, which act as agents on their behalf in order to maximise their welfare.
The Constitutional Treaty was intended “to bring Europe closer to its citizens”. It has failed
because it was a halfway house between giving some power to the European Parliament, but
also keeping and strengthening the power and competences of the Council. In the end, it was
rejected because too many citizens felt that this institutional argument condemned them to a
simple market-oriented model of politics and society (the neo-liberal model, so prominent in
the French debate), without giving them the sovereignty to choose a different course of action
if they so desired. The efficiency of Europe’s governance is handicapped by the issue of
legitimacy. How could Europe find a way out of this dilemma?
Europe’s choices.
Output legitimacy: Blair’s method
9One way is to improve the efficiency of policies. When the United Kingdom took over
the EU presidency for the second semester of 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair (2005)
speaking to the European Parliament made a passionate plea for Europe as a political project.
After 50 years of integration, Europe had to renew. He emphasised the need for increasing
Europe’s credibility by pursuing “the right policies”. The list is long and not terribly original:
modernize Europe’s social model, reform the Common Agricultural Policy, implement the
Lisbon Agenda, improve the macroeconomic framework for Europe, implement an EU action
plan on counter-terrorism, enhance European defence capabilities and secure EU-
enlargement.  No doubt, output legitimacy of European policy making would improve, if this
catalogue would be fully implemented. But this is the problem. Nobody doubts that most
governments know what needs to be done. But the collective action problem prevents the
realisation of these policies. Take the example of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). An
efficient macroeconomic policy framework would require that fiscal policy is clearly defined
at the aggregate level of Euroland, so that the ECB could pursue an active monetary policy
aimed at maintaining price stability and a “high level of employment” (article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union). However, the collective action problem prevents an optimal policy mix:
while each country would benefit from low interest rates if all member states balanced their
budget as stipulated by the SGP, each government on its own has an incentive to borrow at
these low rates and therefore not to balance the budget (yet), as the financial costs are lower
than the political costs of rising taxes and cutting expenses. Hence, in aggregate the European
budget position is in deficit and monetary policy paralysed. The aggregate fiscal position of
Euroland evolves as a random walk subject to the vagaries of national policies, while the ECB
operates in an uncertain and opaque environment therefore responding only slowly to
economic shocks. Not surprisingly, European growth is lagging behind America.
This example shows the need for efficient institutions at the European level. The
solution to the failing Stability and Growth Pact would be to define the aggregate fiscal stance
at the European level. But this immediately poses problems for legitimacy. The axiom “No
taxation without representation” implies that setting the aggregate fiscal policy stance is
impossible without European democracy. Otherwise, the loss of input legitimacy would
undermine the gain from output efficiency. The same is true for many other policy areas,
where the interests of all citizens living in the EU are affected. Hence, the conclusion must be
that emphasizing “right policies” and output legitimacy are not sufficient for Europe to regain
its credibility as a model worthwhile to be supported by its citizens. Unless the institutional
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issue is tackled, Blair’s new Europe will increasingly become “the synonym for missed
objectives and failed promises”. Thus, unless European political leaders agree on a
constitution that reflects citizens’ desire for democracy, the likelihood is high that “new
Europe” returns to the “prehistoric Europe” of competing nation-states and economic
stagnation.
Return to values: muddling through
If efficient policies will not materialise due to collective actions problems, output
legitimacy will suffer. Many pro-Europeans therefore seek to complement the latter by
referring to common values, which provide input legitimacy. According to this approach,
European governments should do the right things because they share similar values, which
take precedence over narrow partial interests.
Most prominent representatives of this way of thinking are old-fashioned Euro-
federalists. The federal idea has had enormous influence on the foundation of the European
Community in the early 1950s and since then on its development to the Union of today, even
if it has fallen in discredit in the UK under Margaret Thatcher. The rejection of the French and
Dutch referenda has been seen by many as the confirmation that these ideas have run into a
cul-de-sac. There is truth in this interpretation, although not necessarily in the sense Anti-
Europeans seem to believe. For federalists, the appeal to European values means putting
forward an European identity, a shared set of common values, a European culture based on a
common history that has left no nation alone. But at the same time, these values imply
distinguishing the European “We”-identity from “them”, “us” from those who are different
and do not share the common heritage. Thus, it is often Euro-federalists who oppose most
fervently the accession of Turkey or Ukraine to the European Union, and the affirmation of
European identity, for example as opposition to the war in Iraq, can quickly turn into anti-
Americanism.
However, even more important is the fact that emphasizing values and feelings of
identity also brings out what separates European cultures. For examples, in a recent debate in
the British House of Lords, Baroness Noakes (2005) proclaimed: “Europe is not a nation. It
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does not have citizens. The constitution perpetuated the myth of European citizenship, but
citizenship is allegiance to and protection by a country. UK citizens do not owe allegiance to
Europe. If anything, they look to their own country for protection against interference by the
EU. (…) There is no European demos. (…) European democracy is a contradiction in terms.
Those who use “Europeancitizens” language betray their federalist aspirations”. The point
here is that emphasizing European values brings up the defence of national values. This is a
game, where Europe can only loose. Most citizens living in Europe identify first with their
nation state, even if they consider themselves simultaneously Europeans (48 percent). Only 7
percent see themselves as foremost or exclusively European, while 37 percent think of
themselves as exclusively nationals.
In conclusion, value-based legitimacy for European policies is more likely to be
counter-productive than capable of closing the legitimacy deficit that is dug up by the
collective action problem. Another method for providing input legitimacy is needed.
Political Union plus democracy: the way forward to New Europe
When Jean Monnet first explained his idea of European unification, he compared it to
hiking in the mountains, where the landscape gradually, but inevitably, changes as the hiker
moves closer to the summit. 50 years of European integration have profoundly changed the
political landscape (Duchene, 1994). Possibly the most important transformation that has
taken place is the acceptance that European law has acquired supranational normativity and is
thus binding on the member states and their citizens. The entrenched rights and procedures
established at the European macro-level have thereby become a source for legitimacy at the
micro-level. The next step is now to close the circle by legitimising policy-making (the
macro-level) through universal suffrage, thereby giving sovereignty to whom it belongs: to
citizens, who are affected by those policies. Effectively this implies establishing a political
union with full democracy. I have called this previously the European Republic (Collignon,
2003, 2004); in substance it simply means that Europeans already live with a wide range of
common goods (their res publica), but they now need the institutions that allow them to
govern themselves efficiently.
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The basic idea is simple enough. In policy areas where the logic of collective action
leads to coordination failure, responsibility for governing Europe’s collective goods must be
delegated to an authority that acts as a European government. All other policy areas remain
under national competence and may be subject to intergovernmental cooperation. A European
government must be made accountable to all citizens and therefore be chosen by the European
Parliament and elected through universal suffrage. This would transform the EU’s polity in
two important ways. First, a European government would have the salience that
intergovernmental compromising in the Council could never produce. Therefore, voters
would have the sense that their vote matters, as they could choose between parties and
programs that compete for power. Hence, there is a gain in input legitimacy. Second, a
European government acting as an agent for European citizens would be efficient. Instead of
hard-wrought compromises worked out by armies of bureaucrats and endorsed by ever-
changing politicians, a single, unified administration would implement policies that reflect the
majoritarian will of citizens. These policies are about interests and not about feelings of
identity. A political Union with full democracy therefore increases both, the supply of input
and of output legitimacy.
Thus, we find that the constitutional issue still is and will remain at the centre of
European politics today. Trying to escape it, as the emphasis on “right policies” and
“reforming Europe” attempts, will lead to the slow erosion of the European project.
Supporters of this strategy may find it an exciting perspective to see the European
Commission becoming “an OECD with teeth”, as a British colleague of mine once said, but
Jean Monnet’s dream of uniting people would be dead. Muddling through with value-
patriotism is also no option, as this is more likely to divide nations within Europe and
mobilize anti-American sentiments outside. The question is then, how can the constitutional
process be revived after the failed referenda in France and in the Netherlands?
The solution lies in the Union reflecting on its democracy. After mourning the failed
Constitutional Treaty, governments should make a renewed attempt to match their actions to
the proclaimed purpose of reconnecting Europe with its citizens. For this purpose, they should
convene a new intergovernmental conference to change the existing Treaty of Nice. They
would establish first the right to an elected constitutional assembly and then actually convoke
one. Alternatively they would delegate that role to the European Parliament. This assembly
would be charged with preparing a constitution for a political union to administer the tasks
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agreed by member states when they ratified the earlier treaties. Also, it would be required to
draw up rules for the democratic working of the Union’s institutions to give European citizens
collectively the ultimate choice over EU policy-making. The new Constitution would then
require to be ratified by a pan-European referendum and it would be adopted if approved by a
majority of citizens. If, however, individual countries so decided they would be free
separately to opt out of the political Union, without necessarily having to withdraw from the
EU’s established economic arrangements This arrangement should actually appeal to both,
those who see the need for more European integration and those who feel no attachment to a
European identity.  .
This idea has many advantages over rescuing the rejected Constitutional Treaty by
forming a limited coalition of the willing or cherry-picking aspects of the failed project. The
idea of core-Europe has often appeared in policy debates and has found some reality in the
creation of monetary union or the application of the Schengen agreement in less than all 25-
member states. However, the formation of an avant-garde group of countries is problematic. It
risks splitting the Union in diverging groups for different policy areas and undermines the
coherence of policy making. Although it might internalise externalities in a limited way,
Europe à la carte prevents coherent and efficient policies and increases the democratic deficit
because the diversification of tasks makes democratic choice by citizens impossible. By
delegating constitution writing to a democratically elected body and by giving citizens as
individuals the opportunity to endorse the outcome rather than confining them to cultural
stereotypes of “countries”, the collective interest of the Union is respected. If, however, some
nation felt unable to accept this result, they could withdraw, without necessarily putting into
question the advantages of belonging to a large and efficient single market. The governance of
this market would still be improved, as policy-making is this domain would then be reduced
to negotiations with a small number of out-countries and the democratically elected
government of the Political Union. From this perspective, the Political Union would resemble
a house in the garden of Economic Union. At the same time, this perspective would ground
the debate about enlargement of the Union on a more rational foundation, as not every new
accession candidate might want to join the Political Union, but may well be keen to benefit
economically.
The crisis opened by the No-vote to the EU Constitutional Treaty may thus turn out a blessing
in disguise, if it helped to relaunch the unification process by giving it a solid foundation in
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Europe’s most fundamental political value: democracy. European unification has been the
great adventure of our time. It is a historically unprecedented experiment. Today, uniting
citizens across Europe means establishing a democracy that allows them to take their destiny
into their own hands.
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